

# THE BATTLE OF THE ḤARRA

## Some Socio-Economic Aspects

The numerous reports of the revolt against Yazid b. Mu'āwiya b. abi Sufyān in Medina and the bloody battle of the Ḥarra (27 Dhū l-Ḥijja, 63 AH = 26 August, AD 683) contain many details on the preparations for the battle, letters sent by the Caliph to the leaders of the rebels, speeches of the leaders and the battle itself, as well as about rebels killed on the battlefield or executed at the order of Muslim b. 'Uqba, the commander of the army sent by Yazid to quell the rebellion.<sup>1</sup> The various accounts, some

<sup>1</sup> See Khalifa b. Khayyāṭ, *Ta'rikh* (ed. Ḍiyā' al-Dīn al-'Umarī) (Baghdād, 1386/1967) i, 224–225; Ibn Sa'd, *Ṭabaqāt* (Beirut, 1377/1957) v, 38–39, 144–147, 170–172, 177, 215, 225–226, 255–256, 259–260, 263–267, 270, 274–275, 277–280, 295–296, 298; al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-ashraf* (ed. M. Schloessinger) (Jerusalem, 1938) ivb, 19–46; al-Ya'qūbī, *Ta'rikh* (al-Najaf, 1384/1964) ii, 237–238; al-Dīnawarī, *al-Akhbār al-ṭiwāl* (ed. 'Abd al-Mun'im 'Amīr — Jamāl al-Dīn al-Shayyāl) (Cairo, 1960), 264–267; al-Fākihī, *Ta'rikh Makka*, Ms. Leiden Or. 463, fol. 400a; Muṣ'ab b. 'Abdallah al-Zubayrī, *Nasab Quraysh* (ed. Levi-Provençal) (Cairo, 1953), 133, 215, 222, 228, 256, 282, 361, 371, 384; al-Ṭabarī, *Ta'rikh* (Cairo, 1358/1939) iv, 366–381; Ibn Qutayba, *'Uyūn al-akhbār* (Cairo, 1343/1924) i, 202; Ibn 'Abd Rabbihi, *al-'Iqd al-farīd* (ed. Aḥmad Amīn, Aḥmad al-Zayn, Ibrāhīm al-Abyārī) (Cairo, 1381/1962) iv, 387–390; al-Mas'ūdī, *Murūj al-dhahab* (ed. Muḥammad Muḥyi l-Dīn 'Abd al-Ḥamīd) (Cairo, 1357/1938) iii, 17–18; idem, *al-Tanbih wa-l-ishraf* (ed. de Goeje) (Leiden, 1894), 304–306; Ibn Qutayba, *al-Ma'arīf* (ed. al-Ṣāwī) (Cairo, 1390/1970; reprint), 153, 172; Ps. Ibn Qutayba, *al-Imāma wa-l-siyāsa* (Cairo, 1331) i, 168–190; Abū l-Faraj, *al-Aghānī* (Cairo, 1285) i, 12–16; Ibn Ra's Ghanama, *Manāqil al-durar fi manābit al-zahar*, Ms. Chester Beatty 4254, fols. 73b–81a; Ibn 'Asākir, *Ta'rikh (tahdhīb)* (ed. Ibn Badrān) (Damascus, 1351) vii, 372–374, 407–413; Sibṭ Ibn al-Jauzī, *Tadhkirat al-khawāṣṣ* (al-Najaf, 1383/1964), 287–292; al-Dhahabī, *Ta'rikh al-Islām* (Cairo, 1368) ii, 354–359; idem, *Siyar a'lām al-nubalā'* (ed. As'ad Ṭalas) (Cairo, 1962) iii, 217–220; Ibn Kathīr, *al-Bidāya wa-l-nihāya* (Beirut — al-Riyāḍ, 1966) vi, 233–235; viii, 211–212, 215–224; al-Qurṭubī, *al-Tadhkira* (ed. Aḥmad Muḥammad Mursī) (Cairo, n.d.), 605–606; al-Damīrī, *Ḥayāt al-ḥayawān* (Cairo, 1383/1963) i, 60–61; al-Bayhaqī, *al-Maḥāsīn wa-l-masāwī* (ed. Muḥammad Abū l-Faḍl Ibrāhīm) (Cairo, 1380/1961) i, 99–104; Muṭahhar b. Ṭāhir al-Maqdisī, *al-Bad' wa-l-ta'rikh* (ed. C. Huart) (Paris, 1919) vii, 13–14; al-Suyūṭī, *Ta'rikh al-khulafā'* (ed. Muḥammad Muḥyi l-Dīn 'Abd al-Ḥamīd) (Cairo,

of which contain divergent details or contradictions, help us nevertheless to gain an insight into the consecutive stages of the conflict, the attitudes of different tribal groups and their leaders and the particulars of the military operation.

The reports on the factors of the conflict between the Caliph and the people of Medina and the causes of the revolt are, however, meagre and give almost unanimous emphasis to the religious motives of the clash. Some scattered details, occurring in fragmentary accounts outside the generally known sources, may shed new light on the roots of the conflict and the factors which were responsible for the battle of the Ḥarra.

## I

Some details of the relations between Yazid and Medina may be surveyed in the following lines. In the short period beginning with the investiture of Yazid as Caliph and ending with the battle of the Ḥarra, there were frequent changes of governors in Medina. The governor appointed by Mu'āwiya, al-Walid b. 'Utba, was deposed shortly after Yazid ascended the throne because he failed to prevent the escape of the two Qurashī leaders, al-Ḥusayn and 'Abdallah b. al-Zubayr.<sup>2</sup> His successor, 'Amr b. Sa'id al-Ashdaq,<sup>3</sup> also failed to get an oath of allegiance from 'Abdallah b. al-Zubayr or to seize him. He was then ordered by the Caliph to send against him a troop levied from among the people listed in the payment-roll.<sup>4</sup> A supplementary passage records the composition of the force sent by 'Amr b. Sa'id: four hundred soldiers, groups of the *mawālī bani umayya* and groups not listed in the payment list.<sup>5</sup> The people enrolled in the *diwān* were reluctant to set out for Mecca in order to fight 'Abdallah b. al-Zubayr.<sup>6</sup> Abū Mikhnaf stresses in his report that the majority of

1371/1952), 209–210; al-Diyārbakrī, *Ta'rikh al-khamīs* (Cairo, 1283) II, 302–303; al-Samhūdī, *Wafā' al-wafā' bi-akhbār dār al-Muṣṭafā* (ed. Muḥammad Muḥyi I-Dīn 'Abd al-Ḥamid) (Cairo, 1374/1955) I, 125–138; Ibn al-'Imād, *Shadharāt al-dhabab* (Beirut, n.d.; reprint) I, 71; Khalil b. Aybak al-Ṣafādī, *Tamām al-mutūn fī sharḥ risālat Ibn Zaydūn* (ed. Muḥammad Abū l-Faḍl Ibrāhīm) (Cairo, 1389/1969), 208–212; al-'Iṣāmī, *Simṭ al-nujūm al-'awālī* (Cairo, 1380) III, 88–94; and see *EI*<sup>2</sup>, s. v. al-Ḥarra (L. Vecchia Vaglieri).

<sup>2</sup> J. Wellhausen, *Das arabische Reich und sein Sturz* (Berlin, 1902; reprint), 92.

<sup>3</sup> Al-Balādhurī, *op. cit.* ivb, 23, lines 9–10.

<sup>4</sup> See al-Balādhurī, *op. cit.* ivb, 23, lines 18–19: . . . *kataba ilā 'amri bni sa'idin al-ashdaqī ya'muruhu an yuwajjitha ilā 'abdi llāhi bni l-zubayri jayshan min ahli l-'aṭā'i wa-l-diwāni . . .* (al-Balādhurī records it from the report of al-Wāqidī).

<sup>5</sup> Al-Balādhurī, *op. cit.* ivb, 25, lines 15–21. <sup>6</sup> Ps. Ibn Qutayba, *op. cit.* I, 184: . . . *fa-ḍaraba 'alā ahli l-diwāni l-ba'tha ilā makkata wa-hum kārihūna li-l-khurūji.*

the recruited force preferred not to join the force and sent instead hired men, who ought to fight in their place. Most of the force sympathized with 'Abdallah b. al-Zubayr. 'Abdallah b. al-Zubayr sent against them troops recruited from among the people of al-Ḥijāz who were imbued with a fighting spirit and religious zeal and convinced that they were fighting for a just cause.<sup>7</sup> It was no wonder that the force sent by the governor of Medina under the command of 'Amr b. al-Zubayr (the brother of 'Abdallah b. al-Zubayr) was defeated; 'Amr b. al-Zubayr was captured and treacherously and cruelly executed.

The sympathy of wide circles of the Muslim community was indeed with 'Abdallah b. al-Zubayr. There were some doubts about the stability and duration of the Umayyad rule and an apprehension that 'Abdallah b. al-Zubayr may succeed in grasping the power from the Umayyads. This feeling of uncertainty was rife even among some Umayyad officials. The governor of Medina, 'Amr b. Sa'īd, according to one tradition, sent a messenger to 'Abdallah b. 'Amr b. al-Āṣ (who stayed in Egypt) inquiring about it. 'Abdallah b. 'Amr b. al-Āṣ, well known for his knowledge, piety and his ability to foretell future events because he was acquainted with the "Book of Daniel", answered that the rule would continue to be in the hands of the Umayyad Caliph and that 'Abdallah b. al-Zubayr would not succeed in his effort to seize authority in the Muslim Empire. This led 'Amr b. Sa'īd to take several measures so as to get hold of 'Abdallah b. al-Zubayr by stratagem and deceit.<sup>8</sup> 'Abdallah b. al-Abbās proved to have had a sound evaluation of the situation after the death of Mu'āwiya: He assured the people in his presence that the Umayyad rule would endure and summoned them to give the oath of allegiance to Yazid.<sup>9</sup> These stories may be spurious, but they help us to gauge the trends in some influential circles of the Muslim community.

'Amr b. Sa'īd failed to seize 'Abdallah b. al-Zubayr, or to compel him to give the oath of allegiance to Yazid. He was deposed (in Dhū l-Ḥijja, 61 AH) and explained to the Caliph the causes of his failure: He did not have at his disposal regular troops by which he could have subdued 'Abdallah b. al-Zubayr. Yazid rightly reprimanded him, asking why

<sup>7</sup> See al-Balādhurī, *op. cit.* ivb, 24, lines 14–16: ... *wa-kāna aktharu l-jayshi budalā'a min al-'aṭā'i wa-julluhum yahwauna bna l-zubayri 'abda llāhi, fa-sārū ḥattā ntahau ilā makkata, fa-akhraja ilayhim 'abdu llāhi bnu l-zubayri rijālan min ahli l-ḥijāzi, dhawī dīnin wa-faḍlin wa-ra'yin wa-thabātin wa-baṣā'ira* . . . ; cf. Ps. Ibn Qutayba, *op. cit.* i, 184 inf.

<sup>8</sup> Al-Ṭabarī, *op. cit.* iv, 365–366; Ibn Ra's Ghanama, *op. cit.*, fol. 72b.

<sup>9</sup> Ps. Ibn Qutayba, *op. cit.* i, 166 inf.–167 sup.

he did not ask for a military force to be despatched from Syria.<sup>10</sup> Al-Walid b. 'Utba was reinstated as governor of Medina in 61 AH and was the official leader of the *hajj* in that year.<sup>11</sup>

'Abdallah b. al-Zubayr feigning loyalty to Yazid, and hinting that he would be ready to undertake some acts of reconciliation, complained to the Caliph of the rudeness of al-Walid b. 'Utba and asked to replace him by a milder governor. Yazid responded, deposed al-Walid b. 'Utba and appointed 'Uthmān b. Muḥammad b. abī Sufyān. The pilgrimage ceremony was still officially led by al-Walid b. 'Utba in 62 AH.<sup>12</sup>

'Uthmān b. Muḥammad, an inexperienced and lenient young man, remained in the office of the governor only eight months.<sup>13</sup> He tried to start a new policy of appeasement with the malcontent Medinans, who openly manifested their sympathy for 'Abdallah b. al-Zubayr. He despatched, at the Caliph's order, a representative deputation of the nobles (*ashrāf*) of the city to Damascus, the capital of the Empire. They were welcomed by the Caliph and granted munificent gifts. However, when they returned to Medina they circulated shocking stories about the licentious behaviour of the profligate and corrupt Caliph, stirred the people against him and threw off his allegiance.<sup>14</sup> The leaders of the rebellion, 'Abdallah b. Ḥanzala,<sup>15</sup> 'Abdallah b. al-Muṭi',<sup>16</sup> Ma'qil b. Sinān<sup>17</sup> and others, were heedless to the warnings and advice of the

<sup>10</sup> Cf. al-Ṭabarī, *op. cit.* iv, 367; al-Balādhurī, *op. cit.* ivb, 29, lines 12–18.

<sup>11</sup> Khalifa, *op. cit.* i, 225 penult.–226, ll. 2–5; al-Ṭabarī, *op. cit.* iv, 366.

<sup>12</sup> Al-Balādhurī, *op. cit.* ivb, 29 penult.–30 sup. (and see p. 19, lines 15–16); al-Ṭabarī, *op. cit.* iv, 368 sup., 369, line 3 from bottom; according to Khalifa, *op. cit.* i, 227, line 7 the *hajj* was led in 62 AH by 'Uthmān b. Muḥammad b. abī Sufyān.

<sup>13</sup> Wakī', *Akhbār al-quḍāt* (ed. 'Abd al-'Aziz Muṣṭafā al-Marāghī) (Cairo, 1366/1947) i, 123.

<sup>14</sup> See Khalifa, *op. cit.* i, 227–228; Ibn Ra's Ghanama, *op. cit.*, fol. 74a (quoted from Khalifa); al-Ṭabarī, *op. cit.* iv, 368; al-Balādhurī, *op. cit.* ivb, 31; Ibn 'Asākir, *op. cit.* vii, 372; Ibn Ḥajar, *al-Iṣāba* (Cairo, 1328) ii, 299, No. 4637 (quoted from Khalifa); Ibn 'Abd Rabbihi, *op. cit.* iv, 387 inf.–388; al-Dhahabī, *Ta'rikh* ii, 354.

<sup>15</sup> See on him *EI*<sup>2</sup>, s.v. 'Abd Allah b. Ḥanzala (Zettersteen–Pellat).

<sup>16</sup> See on him *EI*<sup>2</sup>, s.v. 'Abd Allah b. Muṭi' (Zettersteen–Pellat); and see al-Fāsi, *al-'Iqd al-thamīn* (ed. Fu'ād Sayyid) (Cairo, 1385/1966) v, 287/288 (and see the references given by the editor).

<sup>17</sup> See on him Ibn Qutayba, *al-Ma'ārif*, 129; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, *al-Istī'āb* (ed. 'Alī Muḥammad al-Bijāwī) (Cairo, 1380/1960), 1431, No. 2460 (and see the list of the Qurashites killed when in bonds on the order of Muslim b. 'Uqba after the defeat at al-Ḥarra; the list is given according to the accounts of Ibn Ishāq, al-Wāqidī and Wathim a); Ibn Ḥajar, *al-Iṣāba* iii, 446, No. 8136.

messengers sent to Medina or friendly persons writing to them from Damascus.<sup>18</sup> They tried to dissuade them from getting involved in a clash with the force which the Caliph prepared against them. But the Medianan malcontents felt that they were united in their resistance to the licentious Caliph and that his messengers merely attempted to undermine this unity.<sup>19</sup> It may be pointed out that this so-called unity was not total: The 'Alids remained neutral and did not join the rebels.<sup>20</sup> 'Abdallah b. 'Umar stressed the legitimacy of the oath of allegiance to Yazid.<sup>21</sup> Persons like 'Abdallah b. al-'Abbās, Abū Barza, and 'Abdallah b. 'Umar denied that the struggle between 'Abdallah b. al-Zubayr and the Umayyads was for the cause of God: Both parties fought, in their opinion, to gain their lot in this world.<sup>22</sup> When 'Abdallah b. al-Zubayr asked the wife of 'Abdallah b. 'Umar to prevail upon her husband that he should join him and grant him the oath of allegiance, he argued that his decision to come out in revolt against the impious Mu'āwiya, his son and his family was due to the fact that the latter appropriated for themselves the revenues (*fay'*, belonging, of course, by right to the believers — K.); he did it for the cause of God, His Prophet, the Muhājirūn and the Anṣār. When the wife brought 'Abdallah b. al-Zubayr's message to Ibn 'Umar, the latter remarked that 'Abdallah b. al-Zubayr desired no more than the grey mules on which Mu'āwiya performed his pilgrimage.<sup>23</sup> There was almost no *Ṣaḥābī* who took an active part in the revolt of Medina.<sup>24</sup> The opinions of the pious about the two parties struggling in order to gain authority, power and a share of this world is in full agreement with Wellhausen's conclusion that the religious formulation given to the rebels' arguments against the Umayyads was used as a cover for their

<sup>18</sup> Of special interest is the role played by 'Abdallah b. Ja'far, who interceded with Yazid for the Medianans (see e.g. Ps. Ibn Qutayba, *op. cit.*, 169 inf.–170; these details were omitted in Zettersteen's entry on 'Abdallah b. Ja'far in *EI*?).

<sup>19</sup> See e.g. al-Balādhurī, *op. cit.* ivb, 32: . . . *yā nu'mānu qad jī'tanā bi-amrin turīdu bihi tafriqa jamā'atinā wa-ifsāda mā aṣḥaha llāhu min amrinā* . . .; Ibn Sa'd, *op. cit.* v, 145; al-Ṭabarī, *op. cit.* iv, 369; Ps. Ibn Qutayba, *op. cit.* i, 170.

<sup>20</sup> Ibn Sa'd, *op. cit.* v, 215; cf. Ibn Kathīr, *op. cit.* viii, 218.

<sup>21</sup> Ibn Sa'd, *op. cit.* v, 144; al-Dhahabī, *Ta'rikh* ii, 355, sup.; Ibn Ra's Ghanama, *op. cit.*, fol. 72a; al-'Iṣāmī, *op. cit.* iii, 90 inf.

<sup>22</sup> Al-Fākīhī, *op. cit.*, fol. 402a, inf.–402 sup.; cf. al-Balādhurī, *op. cit.* v, 195–196 (ed. S.D. Goitein); Ibn Ra's Ghanama, *op. cit.*, fol. 72a; al-Ḥākim, *al-Mustadrak* (Hyderabad, 1342) iv, 470.

<sup>23</sup> Abū l-Faraj, *op. cit.* i, 12.

<sup>24</sup> See al-'Iṣāmī, *op. cit.* iii, 91: . . . *wa-lam yuwāfiq ahla l-madīnati 'alā hādihā l-khal'i ahadun min akābiri aṣḥābi rasūli llāhi(s)*.

desire to gain political authority and power.<sup>25</sup> There seems, however, to have been a considerable difference in aims and objectives between the rebels of Medina and those who resisted the Umayyad authority and prepared their rebellion under the leadership of ʿAbdallah b. al-Zubayr in Mecca.

## II

The widely current report, as recorded in the sources, is that the cause of the revolt in Medina was the fact that the Medinan leaders were reluctant to give the oath of allegiance to Yazīd after they had seen his licentious behaviour when they paid a visit to his court.

A quite different account of the causes of the revolt in Medina is given in al-Yaʿqūbī's (d. 292 AH) *Ta'rikh*,<sup>26</sup> where it is related that Yazīd appointed ʿUthmān b. Muḥammad b. Abī Sufyān as governor over Medina. Ibn Mīnā, who was in charge of the estates of Muʿāwiya (*ṣawāfi muʿāwiyata*), came to ʿUthmān and informed him that the people of Medina did not let him collect the crops of wheat and dates and carry them (scil. to the Caliph — K.) as he had been in the habit of doing every year. The governor, ʿUthmān b. Muḥammad, summoned a group of people from Medina and rebuked them harshly for their deed. They rose in revolt against him and against the Banū Umayya in Medina and expelled them from the city; on their way out the expelled Umayyads had stones thrown at them.

A similar report is recorded by al-Samhūdī (d. 911 AH) in his *Wafāʾ al-wafā*.<sup>27</sup> It is, as al-Samhūdī remarks, a summary (*mulakkhkaṣ*) of an account of al-Wāqidī, as given in his "*Kitāb al-Ḥarra*". Ibn Mīnā in this report carries the title "*ʿāmil ʿalā ṣawāfi l-madīna*", "the official in charge of the estates of al-Madīna". "There were at that time many *ṣawāfi* in Medina," the report says. Muʿāwiya yielded from the estates of Medina and its environs (*aʿrāḍuhā*) crops amounting to a hundred fifty thousand *wasq* of dates and a hundred thousand *wasq* wheat. After the appointment of ʿUthmān b. Muḥammad by Yazīd, Ibn Mīnā came with a party (of labourers — K.) from the Ḥarra, betaking himself to the lands (*amwāl*) of Muʿāwiya. He led the party unhindered until he reached the area of the Balḥārith b. al-Khazraj and proceeded to till (*naqaba*) the fields in their territory. The Balḥārith came out and had an argument with Ibn

<sup>25</sup> Wellhausen, *op. cit.*, 102–103.

<sup>26</sup> Ed. Muḥammad Ṣādiq Baḥr al-ʿulūm (al-Najaf, 1384/1964) II, 237.

<sup>27</sup> I, 127–128.

Minā, stating that he had no right to carry out his work and that his action was an unlawful innovation (*ḥadath*) and (constituted — K.) an injury (*ḍarar*) for them. The governor, having been informed by Ibn Minā about the conflict, asked three men of the Balḥārith to grant Ibn Minā a permit to pass their territory. They gave their consent, but when he came with his party to work, the Balḥārith barred him from the estates. When he complained to the governor, the latter ordered him to “gather those he could” against them (i.e. against the Balḥārith — K.) and attached to this troop some of (his) soldiers (*baʿda jundin*). He ordered him to cross their lands “even if they had to do it on their bellies” (*wa-lau ʿalā buṭūnihim*; scil. on the bellies of the Balḥārith — K.), as the wording of the account puts it. When Ibn Minā proceeded next day with his party to the estates of Muʿāwiya, he was confronted by a party of Anṣār who came aided by a group of Qurashites and prevented him from carrying out his work. The situation became serious and Ibn Minā returned to the governor, reporting the events. The governor communicated with the Caliph and urged him to take steps against the people of Medina. The Caliph decided to dispatch a military force against Medina.

Al-Wāqidi’s brief report, as given by al-Samhūdī at the end of the ninth century (AH) can be supplemented by additional details from a combined account recorded by Abū l-ʿArab (d. 333 AH) at the end of the third century and based mainly on the authority of al-Wāqidi.<sup>28</sup> The first sentences of the account are almost identical;<sup>29</sup> the account differs, however, on some important particulars of the story. The clashes of Ibn Minā and his labourers with the Balḥārith, says the account, continued for a month. They sometimes allowed him to carry out some work; sometimes they gathered against him and no work could be done at all.<sup>30</sup> After Ibn Minā complained to the governor, the latter summoned three men from the Balḥārith: Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallah b. Zayd, Zuhayr b. abī Masʿūd and Muḥammad b. al-Nuʿmān b. al-Bashīr. They gave their consent and Ibn Minā came with his labourers and did some work. A group of people of Medina: al-Miswar b. Makhrama,<sup>31</sup> ʿAbd al-Raḥmān

<sup>28</sup> Abū l-ʿArab, *Kitāb al-miḥan*, Ms. Cambridge Qq. 235, fols. 51a–65a; see on the author: Sezgin, *GAS* I, 356–357.

<sup>29</sup> The difference in the quantities of the crops recorded here (51,000 *wasq* dates and 100,000 *wasq* wheat) may probably be traced back to a clerical error.

<sup>30</sup> See *al-Miḥan*, fol. 51b: . . . *wa-ḍararun ʿalaynā, fa-makathū ʿalā dhālika shahran, yaghdū bnu minā wa-yarūhu bi-ʿummālihi fa-marratan yaʿbauna ʿalayhi . . .*

<sup>31</sup> See on him Muṣʿab b. ʿAbdallah, *op. cit.*, 262–263; Anonymous, *al-Taʿrikh al-muḥkam*, Ms.Br.Mus., Or. 8653, fol. 111b; Ibn Ḥajar, *al-Iṣāba* III, 419, No. 7993;

b. ‘Abd al-Qāri,<sup>32</sup> ‘Abd al-Rahmān b. al-Aswad b. ‘Abd Yaghūth,<sup>33</sup> ‘Abdallah b. Muṭīf and ‘Abdallah b. abī Rabī‘a,<sup>34</sup> went to “these people” (apparently the Balḥārith who gave their consent to resume the work of Ibn Minā — K.), incited them<sup>35</sup> and asked them not to permit Ibn Minā to till in their estates<sup>36</sup> except by their consent and willingness. The rest of the story agrees with al-Samhūdī:<sup>37</sup> The force of Ibn Minā, aided by soldiers supplied by the governor, was barred from work by a Qurashī-Anṣārī troop. Some divergence can be noticed in an additional passage recorded by Abū l-‘Arab, on the authority of al-Wāqidi:<sup>38</sup> A delegation composed of ten Qurashites and a group of Anṣār called on the governor, ‘Uthmān b. Muḥammad, and complained about the actions of Ibn Minā and the fact that he had gathered a force against them. They were disappointed to find that the governor himself was behind Ibn Minā and his actions. The conversation between the governor and the delegation became harsh and the governor decided to write to the Caliph on the hostile attitude of the Medinans towards the Caliph. The Caliph despatched to the Medinans a sharp letter warning them of the consequences of their actions and threatening that he would use force against them.

The account recorded by Abū l-‘Arab gives us a better insight into the attitudes of the land-owners in Medina, and the contacts between the Anṣār and the Qurashites in Medina in order to make a common cause against what they regarded as the unlawful claims of the Umayyad ruler and his unjust appropriation of their estates.

Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr, *al-Istī‘āb*, 1399, No. 2405; al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-ashraf* (ed. M. Schloessinger), index.

<sup>32</sup> See on him Ibn Ḥajar, *al-Iṣāba* III, 71, No. 6223; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr, *op. cit.*, 839, No. 1433.

<sup>33</sup> See on him al-Fāsī, *op. cit.* v, 342, No. 1712; Ibn Ḥajar, *op. cit.* II, 390, No. 5081; Muṣ‘ab b. ‘Abdallah, *op. cit.*, 262.

<sup>34</sup> See on him Muṣ‘ab b. ‘Abdallah, *op. cit.*, 318.

<sup>35</sup> In text *مسردوهم*; I could not find a suitable interpretation of this word in this context.

<sup>36</sup> The term in this passage is: . . . *wa-qālū lā tada’ūhu yanqub fī ḥaqqikum illā bi-tibi nafsīn minkum* . . .

<sup>37</sup> It may be remarked that here, in this version, the phrase “and gather against them whom you can” has an additional word: “*min mawālikum*” “from among your mawālī”.

<sup>38</sup> Fol. 52a, line 6: *qāla l-wāqidi: fa-ḥaddathani usāma bnu zaydīn al-laythī ‘an muḥammadi bni qaysin* . . .

## III

Some of the words or terms recorded in the account of al-Wāqidī are obscure and vague. An attempt should be made to elucidate the meanings of these words in order to enable a more accurate understanding of the text.

The account says that Ibn Minā was in charge of the *ṣawāfi* of Medina and adds that there were at that time many *ṣawāfi* in Medina. The word *ṣawāfi* usually denotes “a public land”, “state domains”.<sup>39</sup> Saleh A. el-Ali, referring to the passage discussed here, remarks that al-Wāqidī “probably included in these *ṣawāfi* the public lands and the seven endowments which had belonged to the Prophet. Nevertheless they did not exploit them for their own personal purposes, otherwise they would have aroused opposition and the sources would have mentioned that the Prophet granted several Muslims some of the uncultivated lands either for dwelling, or for cultivation, or for other purposes.”<sup>40</sup>

But *ṣawāfi* in this account, and generally in this period, does not only denote state domains or public land. *Iṣṭafā* implies in fact confiscation of land and property.<sup>41</sup> The confiscated property could be transferred or given as gift. So, for instance, ‘Abdallah b. al-Zubayr confiscated the property of Mu‘āwiya in Mecca; one of the courts confiscated was given by him as a gift to his son Ḥamza.<sup>42</sup> It is implausible to assume that there were “state domains” in Mecca and Medina, as Medina was not conquered by force, and the land of Medina was divided by the Prophet himself and allotted to the people of the *ṣahāba*. The clue for the understanding of the term is given by al-Ya‘qūbī. Mu‘āwiya, al-Ya‘qūbī reports,

<sup>39</sup> See Løkkegaard, *Islamic Taxation in the Classical Period* (Copenhagen, 1950), 49–51.

<sup>40</sup> Saleh A. el-Ali, *Muslim Estates in Hijaz in the First Century AH.*, *JESHO* 2 (1959), 251. The explanation of Muḥammad Muḥyi l-Dīn ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd, the editor of al-Samhūdī’s *Wafā’ al-wafā’*, of the word “*ṣawāfi*” as palm trees (I, 127, n. 1) is erroneous and it is useless to discuss it. H. Lammens (*Le Califat de Yazīd Ier* [Beirut, 1921], 219) translates *ṣawāfi*: “domaines de Mo‘āwia”.

<sup>41</sup> See al-Ṭabarī, *op. cit.*, Glossarium, s.v. *ṣafā*: *ṣāfiyatun id quod confiscatum est, al-ṣawāfi = praedia confiscata*.

<sup>42</sup> Al-Azraqī. *Akhbār Makka* (ed. F. Wüstenfeld) (Leipzig, 1858; reprint), 460: . . . *iṣṭafāhā fī amwālī mu‘āwiyata fa-wahabāhā li-bnihi ḥamzata*; and see *ibid.*, 452. *Ṣawāfi* as recorded by al-Azraqī and al-Samhūdī denote lands and property belonging to and administered by the Caliph. The term usually refers to the property of the Umayyads confiscated by the ‘Abbasids. See e.g. al-Azraqī, *op. cit.*, 461 penult.: . . . *ḥattā uṣṭufiyat ḥīna kharajat al-khilāfatu min banī marwāna . . .*; 467: . . . *iṣṭafāhu amīru l-mu‘minīna abū ja‘far, wa-kāna fihī ḥaqqun qad kāna bā‘du banī umayyata shtarāhu fa-ṣṭufiya minhum . . .*; and see 453: . . . *fa-lam tazal fī l-ṣawāfi ḥattā raddahā*

confiscated the property of people and appropriated it for himself.<sup>43</sup> The true character of Mu'āwiya's *ṣawāfi* in Medina is explicitly exposed in another passage of al-Ya'qūbī. Stressing the appropriation of state-estates in the conquered territories by Mu'āwiya, al-Ya'qūbī says: "He was the first to own *ṣawāfi* in the whole world, even in Mecca and Medina and an amount (of crops — K.) of dates and wheat was carried to him every year."<sup>44</sup> The *ṣawāfi* were thus identical with the *amwāl mu'āwiya*, the private possessions of Mu'āwiya in Medina. Ps. Ibn Qutayba in his *al-Imāma* says that Ibn Minā<sup>45</sup> came with a party<sup>46</sup> of men from the Ḥarra proceeding towards the estates of Mu'āwiya (*yuridu l-amwāla llati kānat li-mu'āwiyata*). The true character of these *ṣawāfi*, or *amwāl*, is indicated in an explanatory sentence added by the author: "These were estates acquired by Mu'āwiya and orchards of date-palms, which yielded hundred sixty thousand *wasqs*."<sup>47</sup> It is indeed the way of acquisition (*iktisāb*) which brought about the conflict between the Medinans and the Caliph.

The reports about Mu'āwiya's *ṣawāfi* are corroborated by numerous reports concerning his purchase of courts, palaces,<sup>48</sup> estates and lands

*l-mu'taṣimu bi-ilāhi . . .*; and see 449, 460, 463, 464, 467: . . . *fa-hiya l-yauma fī l-ṣawāfi*. Comp. al-Samhūdī, *op. cit.* II, 699, lines 11–12: *fa-šarat ba'du fī l-ṣawāfi, wa-kānat al-dawāwīnu fihā wa-baytu l-māli . . .*; *ibid.* II, 721: . . . *anna dāra marwāna šarat fī l-ṣawāfi, ay li-bayti l-māli . . .*; and see *ibid.* II, 729–730. About the "*ṣawāfi daulati banī umayya*" in Egypt see al-Muḥasibī, *A'māl al-qulūb wa-l-jawāriḥ* (ed. 'Abd al-Qādir Aḥmad 'Aṭā) (Cairo, 1969), 230–231.

<sup>43</sup> Al-Ya'qūbī, *op. cit.* II, 221, lines 1–2: . . . *wa-staṣfā amwāla l-nāsi fa-akhadhahā li-nafsihi*; comp. *ibid.*, lines 18–20: . . . *ba'da an akhraja mu'āwiyatu min kulli baladīn mā kānat mulūku fārisa tastaṣfihi li-anfusihā min al-ḍiyā'i l-'āmirati wa-ja'alahu ṣāfiyatan li-nafsihi fa-aqta'ahu jamā'atan min ahli baytihi*. And see about an attempt at confiscation of the property of 'Abdallah b. 'Āmir b. Kurayz: Muṣ'ab b. 'Abdallah, *op. cit.*, 148 inf.; al-Fāsī, *op. cit.* v, 189.

<sup>44</sup> Al-Ya'qūbī, *op. cit.* II, 222, lines 9–13: . . . *wa-fa'ala mu'āwiyatu bi-l-sha'mi wa-l-jazirati wa-l-yamani mithla mā fa'ala bi-l-'irāqi min istiṣfā'i mā kāna li-l-mulūki min al-ḍiyā'i wa-taṣyirihā li-nafsihi khāliṣatan wa-aqta'ahā ahla baytihi wa-khāṣṣatahu; wa-kāna awwala man kānat lahu l-ṣawāfi fī jamī'i l-dunyā ḥattā bi-makkata wa-l-madinati, fa-innahu kāna fthimā shay'un yuḥmalu fī kulli sanatin min ausāqi l-tamri wa-l-ḥiṣṣati*; and see D.C. Dennet Jr., *Conversion and the Poll Tax in Early Islam* (transl. by Fauzi Fahūm Jādallah; revised by Iḥsān 'Abbās) (Beirut, 1960), 65, No. 76 (and see the note of the editor, *ibid.*).

<sup>45</sup> Ps. Ibn Qutayba, *op. cit.* I, 169 (in text: *Ibn Mithā*, a clerical error).

<sup>46</sup> In text erroneously: *bi-sirāḥin*.

<sup>47</sup> I, 169: . . . *wa-kānat amwālan iktasabahā mu'āwiyatu wa-nakhīlan yajuddu minhā mi'ata alfi wasqin wa-sittīna alfan*.

<sup>48</sup> See al-Samhūdī, *op. cit.* III, 962: . . . *wa-ammā qaṣr banī jadilata fa-inna mu-*

in Medina<sup>49</sup> and his activities of cultivation and irrigation.<sup>50</sup> Mu'āwiya's business transactions were carefully planned and thoughtfully worked out.<sup>51</sup>

\* \* \*

'āwiyata bna abī sufyaṅa banāhu li-yakūna ḥiṣnan, wa-lahu bābāni: bābun ṣhāri'un 'alā khaṭṭi banī jadīlata . . . wa-kāna lladhī walīya binā'ahu li-mu'āwiyata l-ḥufaylu bnu abī ka'bin l-anṣāriyyu wa-ḥi wasaṭihi bi'r ḥā' . . . See the story about the purchase of a part of the orchard of Bi'r Ḥā' by Mu'āwiya, *ibid.* III, 962, sup., 963 inf. And see *ibid.* II, 741: . . . wa-kānat ḥādhihi l-dāru (i.e. *dār al-rabī'*, named *dār ḥaḥṣa* — K.) qaṭī'atan min rasūli llahi ṣallā llāhu 'alahi wa-sallam li-'uthmāna bni abī l-'āṣi l-thaqafīyyi fa-btā'ahā min wuldihī mu'āwiyatu bnu abī sufyaṅa . . . (See on 'Uthmān b. abī l-'Āṣ: Ibn Sa'd, *op. cit.* VII, 40; I, 313; VIII, 51). Sa'id b. al-'Āṣ enjoins his son 'Amr to sell only his palace in al-Arṣa after his death to Mu'āwiya, arguing that it is merely a leisure resort, not an agricultural farm (Abū l-Faraj, *op. cit.* I, 17: . . . *innamā ittakhadhtuhu nuzhatan wa-laysa bi-mālin*); and see the story of the acquisition of Arṣa by Mu'āwiya: al-Samhūdī, *op. cit.* III, 1056–1057; Yāqūt, *Mu'jam al-buldān*, s.v. Arṣa (see the report about the building of the palace by Sa'id b. al-'Āṣ, the digging of a well, the planting of orchards and the qualities of these orchards). And see about the building of the fortress Qaṣr Khall by Mu'āwiya: al-Samhūdī, *op. cit.* IV, 1289–90; and see *ibid.* II, 699 (cf. *ibid.*, 701) about the purchase of the court of 'Umar (or the court of 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. 'Auf) by Mu'āwiya. About a court of Mu'āwiya in Medina see Ibn 'Asākir, *op. cit.*, Ms. Ṣāhiriyya, *op. cit.* IX, fol. 109b (. . . *wa-lahu dārun bi-l-madinati tashra'u 'alā balāṭi l-fākihāti* . . .). About two courts, *dār al-nuqṣān* and *dār al-qaṭīrān*, built by Mu'āwiya see al-Samhūdī, *op. cit.* II, 750. About the purchase of the court of Sufyān b. al-Ḥārith b. 'Abd al-Muṭṭalib by Mu'āwiya see al-Samhūdī, *op. cit.* II, 758 (he attached it to the *muṣallā* of the Prophet); comp. al-Fākihī, *op. cit.*, fol. 458a (Mu'āwiya proposes Khālid b. al-'Āṣ to sell him his property. The answer of Khālid is significant: "Do you think that a man would sell the place where his father is buried?").

<sup>49</sup> See about the purchase of the lands of al-Zubayr as recorded in al-Fasawī's *al-Ma'rifa wa-l-ta'rikh*, Ms. Esad Ef. 2391, fol. 129a; and see about an estate bought by Mu'āwiya from Qays b. Sa'd b. 'Ubāda: al-Dhahabī, *Siyar a'lām al-nubalā'* III, 70 (*bā'a qaysu bnu sa'din mālan min mu'āwiyata bi-tis'ina alfan*). About the purchase of Thaniyat al-Sharīd see al-Samhūdī, *op. cit.*, 1066–1067; cf. Saleh A. el-Ali, *op. cit.*, 256. About the purchase of Bughaybigha see: al-Samhūdī, *op. cit.* IV, 1150–1152.

<sup>50</sup> See al-Samhūdī, *op. cit.* III, 937–938; *ibid.*, IV, 1232 (*saddu mu'āwiyā*); III, 985, 987 (*'aynu l-azraq*); and see Majd al-Dīn al-Fayrūzābādī, *al-Maghānim al-muṭāba ft ma'ālim Ṭāba* (ed. Ḥamad al-Jāsir) (al-Riyāḍ, 1389/1969), 295–296. About the irrigation of *rauḍat bani umayya* and *amwāl bani umayya* see al-Samhūdī, *op. cit.* III, 1075. It may be stressed that Mu'āwiya employed a special agent in charge of his estates; in this passage the estates are called "al-ḍiyā'" (al-Samhūdī, *op. cit.* IV, 1276 sup.: *qāla mu'āwiyatu bnu abī sufyaṅa li-'abdī l-raḥmāni bni abī aḥmada bni ḥaḥshin, wa-kāna wakīlahu bi-ḍiyā'ihī bi-l-madinati, ya'nī audiyatan shtarāhā wa-tamalāhā* . . .); cf. al-Balādhurī, *op. cit.* Iva, 110 inf.–111 sup. (ed. M. Schoessinger) (Jerusalem, 1971).

<sup>51</sup> See al-Jahshiyārī, *Kitāb al-wuzarā' wa-l-kuttāb* (ed. al-Saqā, al-Abyārī, al-Shalabī (Cairo, 1357/1938), 26: . . . *ittakhidh li ḍiyā'an wa-lā takun bi-l-dārūm*

It is evident that these palaces, fortresses, courts and estates needed manpower for maintenance and cultivation. This was provided by captives taken in the wars of conquest and by slaves.<sup>52</sup> Groups of skilled labourers were brought from the conquered provinces to Mecca and Medina.<sup>53</sup> Mu'āwiya is said to have been the first Caliph to use forced labour.<sup>54</sup> The *mawālī* were entrusted with various duties and carried out different kinds of work, as imposed on them by their patrons. Consequently the *mawālī* society was not based on egalitarian principles; among a group of *mawālī*, attached to a certain family or clan, there were great differences of rank and position. They were considered loyal and reliable. When Mu'āwiya complained to Ziyād of the attitude of his relatives, Ziyād advised him to rely upon *mawālī*, because they were more apt to provide aid, more prone to forgive and more grateful (than others — K.).<sup>55</sup> Possessing a multitude of *mawālī* was considered a sign of strength; families and clans vied among themselves in acquiring *mawālī*. Some of these *mawālī* were absorbed into the clans who strived to gain a firm and strong position.<sup>56</sup> Referring to the contest between the Sufyānids and the Merwānids, each attempting to outnumber the other, 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. al-Ḥakam argues against Mu'āwiya: "If you found none but negroes, you would strive to outnumber us by (adopting and attaching — K.) them" (scil. to your clan — K.).<sup>57</sup>

In the battle of the Ḥarra the *mawālī* fought as a special military formation under the command of Yazīd b. Hurmuz,<sup>58</sup> under their own ban-

*al-mijḍāb, wa-lā bi-qaysariyyata l-mighrāq, wa-ttakhidhā bi-majārī l-sahāb; fa-ttakhadha lahu l-buḥnān min kūrati 'asqalān . . .* As for his policy of purchasing property in Mecca see *JESHO* 15 (1972), 84–85; and see Ibn Ḥajar, *al-Iṣāba* II, 291, No. 4597. Cf. for Syria: al-Balādhurī, *op. cit.* Iva, 50, lines 5–7; 52, lines 7–12.

<sup>52</sup> See Saleh A. el-Ali, *op. cit.*, 252; and see *JESHO* 3 (1960) 334. About "the black and the red" (*al-ḥumrān wa-l-sūdān*) servants (*ghilmān*) of Mu'āwiya working in his estates see: al-Balādhurī, *op. cit.* Iva, 42 inf.–43 sup.

<sup>53</sup> See about labourers who made baked bricks for the houses of Mu'āwiya in Mecca: al-Azraqī, *op. cit.*, 496 ult.–497, lines 1–2; al-Fākihī, *op. cit.*, fol. 503a: *kāna ya'malu fihā nabaṭun ba'atha bihim mu'āwiyatu bnu abī sufyanā (r) ya'malūna l-ajurra li-dārihi bi-makkata . . .*

<sup>54</sup> See al-Ya'qūbī, *op. cit.* II, 221, line 1: . . . *wa-banā wa-shayyada l-binā'a wa-sakhhara l-nāsa fi binā'ihī wa-lam yusakhhir aḥadun qablaha.*

<sup>55</sup> Al-Balādhurī, *op. cit.* Iva, 23, lines 17–18.

<sup>56</sup> See e.g. al-Balādhurī, *op. cit.* v, 163, lines 7–8: . . . *wa-hum yaḍummūna man ta'ashshaba ilayhim li-yata'azzazū bihi.*

<sup>57</sup> Al-Balādhurī, *op. cit.* Iva, 53, lines 12–13: . . . *lau lam tajid illā l-zanja latakaththarta bihim 'alaynā.*

<sup>58</sup> See on him Khalifa b. Khayyāt, *Ṭabaqāt* (ed. Akram Ḍiyā' al-'Umari) (Baghdād,

ner;<sup>59</sup> they were entrusted with the defence of the section of the ditch, dug by the Medinans against the approaching Syrian army, stretching from Rātij<sup>60</sup> until the quarter of the Banū ‘Abd al-Ashhal.<sup>61</sup> Their force was divided into squadrons (*karādīs*) positioned behind each other.<sup>62</sup> They were assaulted by a unit of the Syrian army and called upon to surrender; the commander, Yazīd b. Hurmuz, refused and decided to continue the fight.<sup>63</sup> It is remarkable that the *mawālī* fought in such a steadfast and courageous manner, while the Banū Ḥāritha, who were freemen, forsook their quarter and opened it treacherously, permitting the Syrians to attack their brethren in Medina.<sup>64</sup> Some commentators of the Qur’ān stated indeed that verse 14 of *Sūrat al-aḥzāb*: “If the enemy had entered from all sides and they had been exhorted to treachery, they would have committed it, and would have hesitated thereupon but little,” referred to the shameful deed of the Banū Ḥāritha.<sup>65</sup>

The number of the Umayyad *mawālī*, the *mawālī banī umayya*, or *mawālī mu’āwiya*, seems to have been considerable. This can be gauged from a unique report recorded by Ibn Ra’s Ghanama. The direct cause of the expulsion of the Umayyads from Medina and the throwing off of the allegiance of Yazīd, says the report, was a clash between the people of Medina and the *mawālī mu’āwiya*. A powerful flow of water poured one day into Medina and the people hurried to direct the water into their fields (*ilā amwālihim*). The *mawālī mu’āwiya* went out (apparently in order to divert the water into the estates of Mu’āwiya — K.) and the people started to fight them (apparently preventing them from carrying out their work — K.) and a clash ensued between them (*wa-kharaḥa mawālī mu’āwiyata fa-gātalāhum ahlu l-madinati*). The event took place at the time when Yazīd was denigrated (by the opposition — K.) and Ibn al-Zubayr already had thrown off his allegiance to him, the report remarks. The people of the market hoisted a banner (*fa-‘aqada ahlu*

1387/1967), 249 (. . . *kāna ra’sa l-mawālī yauma l-ḥarra* . . .), 255; al-Balādhurī, *op. cit.* ivb, 35, line 5.

<sup>59</sup> Abū l-‘Arab, *op. cit.*, fol. 53a, ult.

<sup>60</sup> See about Rātij: al-Samhūdī, *op. cit.* iv, 1215.

<sup>61</sup> See Abū l-‘Arab, *op. cit.*, fol. 53a (from Dhubāb until Mirbad al-Na’am, the market of the cattle); al-Samhūdī, *op. cit.* i, 129; iv, 1206, line 1.

<sup>62</sup> Abū l-‘Arab, *op. cit.*, 53a ult.–53b, line 1: . . . *qad ṣaffa aṣḥābahu karādīsa, ba’ qahum khalfā ba’ dīn, ilā ra’si l-thaniyyati* . . .

<sup>63</sup> Abū l-‘Arab, *op. cit.*, fol. 53b.

<sup>64</sup> Al-Samhūdī, *op. cit.* i, 130, penult; Abū l-‘Arab, *op. cit.*, fol. 53b, inf.

<sup>65</sup> Al-Suyūṭī, *al-Durr al-manthūr* (Cairo, 1314) v, 188; al-Samhūdī, *op. cit.* i, 131; al-Dinawarī, *op. cit.*, 265.

*l-sūqi rāyatan*), fought the *mawālī mu'āwiya* and killed (probably some of — K.) them. This caused an upsurge among the people of Medina and they expelled the governor.<sup>66</sup>

Whatever the historical value of this report, it helps us to gain an insight into the character and the duties of a special group established by the ruler, the *mawālī mu'āwiya*. Some of these *mawālī mu'āwiya* took part in the expedition against 'Abdallah b. al-Zubayr, as mentioned above. The Umayyads expelled from Medina left the city accompanied by their *mawālī*.

Important details about the formation of some groups of *mawālī* can be deduced from the story about the dismissal of the governor of Medina, 'Amr b. Sa'id. When al-Walid b. 'Utba was reinstalled as governor of Medina (in 62 AH) he arrested some three hundred *mawālī* and servants (*ghilmān*) of the deposed governor. 'Amr secretly sent a messenger to those arrested, and promised to provide them with camels which would halt in the market of Medina; on a given sign the arrested would break the door of the jail, mount the camels and join him in Syria. The plan was indeed carried out successfully.<sup>67</sup> These *mawālī* thus had personal loyalty and attachment; they were not the official guard of the governor, they were the personal property of 'Amr b. Sa'id. The opinion of the new governor, al-Walid b. 'Utba, seems to have been different: He considered them as property of the state, which had consequently to be transferred to the successive governor. For 'Amr b. Sa'id had fraudulently appropriated to himself the payments sent by the Caliph to the people of Medina and had used these sums for the acquisition of servants and slaves. This was one of the causes for the fact that relations between the people of Medina and the rulers deteriorated and that they felt bitterly about their governor.<sup>68</sup>

Further instances of Umayyad *mawālī*, who identified themselves with their masters and fought bravely for their cause, are recorded. A *maulā* of 'Utba b. abi Sufyān fortified himself with a group of fifty men in

<sup>66</sup> Ibn Ra's Ghanama, *op. cit.*, fol. 74b.

<sup>67</sup> Al-Ṭabarī, *op. cit.* iv, 366–367; Ibn Ra's Ghanama, *op. cit.*, fol. 72b. There is however a remarkable report recorded by Ibn Junghul, in his *Ta'rikh* (Ms. BM Or 5912, i, 162b), according to which the rebelling Medinans under the command of 'Abdallah b. Ḥaṇẓala arrested the slaves (*'abid*) of 'Amr b. Sa'id and got hold of property, possessions and produce in Medina after the return of the deputation from Damascus in 62 AH. The 300 slaves managed to escape according to a plan devised by 'Amr b. Sa'id and succeeded in joining him.

<sup>68</sup> Ps. Ibn Qutayba, *op. cit.* i, 189, lines 17–18.

al-Ṭā'if; he later surrendered and was executed by 'Abdallah b. al-Zubayr in Mecca.<sup>69</sup>

The role of the *mawālī* in the struggle between 'Abdallah b. al-Zubayr and the Umayyads can be deduced from the story of al-Miswar b. Makhrama. He transferred weapons and coats of mail from Medina to Mecca and distributed them among his trained and steadfast *mawālī* in order to fight the Syrian troops sent by Yazid. They surrounded him during the fight, trying to defend him; later they abandoned him, but they succeeded in killing several Syrian soldiers.<sup>70</sup>

The reports quoted above help us to elucidate to some extent the meaning of the two key expressions: "*ṣawāfi mu'āwiya*" and "*mawālī mu'āwiya*". The battle of the Ḥarra with its sad result is closely linked to the *ṣawāfi* and the *mawālī* of the Umayyads.

#### IV

The Medinans, Anṣāris and Qurashites, barring Ibn Minā from access to the estates of Mu'āwiya (i.e. the estates of Yazid — K.), argued that his action constitutes *ḥadath* and *ḍarar*. This would indicate that in their opinion the rights of Mu'āwiya to these estates were unfounded and his ownership caused damage to their rights. This argument was explicitly formulated in the talk of the deputation of Anṣāris and Qurashites who called on the governor of Medina. "You know, they said, that all these estates belong to us and that Mu'āwiya preferred others in the granting of payments and did not give us even a *dirhem*, let alone more.<sup>70a</sup> This was so until the time when we were pressed by hard time and oppressed by hunger, that Mu'āwiya (by exploiting our distress — K.) bought it (i.e. our land — K.) by a hundredth of its (real — K.) value".<sup>71</sup> It is evident that the former landowners considered the acquisition of their property in such a way as an iniquitous transaction by which they were afflicted; they referred to it by the expressions "*ḥadath*" and "*ḍarar*" and considered it void. In their opinion Mu'āwiya's ownership was not lawful and they apparently demanded the restitution of their rights.

In a talk with 'Abdallah b. Ja'far, who interceded for the people of Medina, Yazid responded partly to the demands of the Medinans by promising to grant them as an exceptional favour two payments every

<sup>69</sup> Al-Balādhurī, *op. cit.* ivb, 30, lines 12–15.

<sup>70</sup> Al-Dhahabī, *Siyar a'lām al-nubalā'* iii, 263.

<sup>70a</sup> On the delay of payments to the Ansar, see Ibn 'Asākir, *op. cit.* iii, 369; Ibn Ḥajar, *al-Iṣāba* i, 194, No. 902.

<sup>71</sup> Ps. Ibn Qutayba, *op. cit.* i, 169.

year (in summer and in winter) and to fix the price of wheat in Medina at a rate equal to that in Syria.<sup>72</sup> Yazīd also undertook to repay fully the amounts withheld by Muʿāwiya.<sup>73</sup> In a slightly different version, in which the terms of Muslim b. ʿUqba were formulated, the two former promises, that of making the price of wheat the same as in Syria and that of giving them two payments a year, are supplemented by a promise to repay the amounts dishonestly taken by ʿAmr b. Saʿīd.<sup>74</sup> The Medinans rejected the terms of the Caliph as conveyed by Muslim b. ʿUqba.

The rebelling Medinans had, however, no political programme, nor a plan of action. ʿAbdallah b. al-Zubayr claimed sagaciously and shrewdly that he demanded only to adhere to the idea of the *shūrā*.<sup>75</sup> It is remarkable that it was a courageous *maulā*, Abū Ḥurra, who dared accuse ʿAbdallah b. al-Zubayr of striving to declare himself caliph, not caring to act according to the principle of *shūrā* which he advocated; he consequently parted company with Ibn al-Zubayr.<sup>76</sup> The Medinans, in contradistinction, proclaimed that they would not swear the oath of allegiance to Yazīd, as reported in the current sources.<sup>77</sup> They were overconfident of their victory. They thought that if Syrian troops faced them even for a month they would kill not even one of the Medinans.<sup>78</sup> They exerted themselves in imitating the Prophet in their military tactics and strategy and dug ditches in Medina, basing their defence on this device,<sup>79</sup> as did the Prophet in the Battle of the Ditch. They were asked by their leaders to swear the oath of fighting until death,<sup>80</sup> as did the Companions of the Prophet at al-Ḥudaybiyya. They heedlessly let the Umayyads and their *mawālī* leave Medina, credulously convinced that

<sup>72</sup> Lammens, *op. cit.*, p. 242 reads according to the version of al-Bayhaqī's *al-Maḥāsīn wa-l-masāwī* (I, 101) الحط and translates: "Le calife s'engage a faire vendre chez vous le froment, au prix du fourrage." The text in Ps. Ibn Qutayba, *op. cit.* I, 170: *an aj'ala l-ḥiṅtata 'indahum ka-si'ri l-ḥiṅtati 'indanā; wa-l-ḥiṅtatu 'indahum . . .* and I, 189: *an aj'ala si'ra l-ḥiṅtati 'indakum ka-si'ri l-ḥiṅtati 'indanā . . .* seems to be preferable.

<sup>73</sup> Ps. Ibn Qutayba, *op. cit.* I, 170.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.* I, 189.

<sup>75</sup> See al-Balādhurī, *op. cit.* ivb, 16, line 9; 17, line 6; comp. *ibid.*, 29, line 15; 27, lines 11–12; and see *ibid.* v, 195, lines 9–13; Ibn Ra's Ghanama, *op. cit.*, fol. 73a.

<sup>76</sup> Al-Balādhurī, *op. cit.* ivb, 27; v, 188.

<sup>77</sup> See Ibn Sa'd, *op. cit.* v, 144, line 18; al-Ṭabarī, *op. cit.* iv, 370.

<sup>78</sup> Ibn Sa'd, *op. cit.* v, 146: *kunnā naqūlu: lau aqāmū shahran mā qatalū minnā shay'an.*

<sup>79</sup> Ps. Ibn Qutayba, *op. cit.* I, 173; Abū l-'Arab, *op. cit.*, fol. 53a; al-Samhūdī, *op. cit.* iv, 1205.

<sup>80</sup> Ps. Ibn Qutayba, *op. cit.* I, 173; Abū l-'Arab, *op. cit.*, fol. 53a.

## THE BATTLE OF THE HARRA

they would fulfil their solemn oath not to help the Syrian force if it proceeded against Medina, and that they would even try to persuade the Syrian force not to attack Medina.<sup>81</sup> They could have successfully used the Umayyads as hostages when they faced the attack of the Syrian force against Medina, as Marwān himself rightly estimated.<sup>82</sup>

The Medinan leaders who succeeded in escaping the massacre of the Ḥarra were deeply shocked, disappointed and embittered. They compared their defeat after a short battle, lasting less than a day, with the resistance of ʿAbdallah b. al-Zubayr which lasted six months; the fighting force in Medina numbered two thousand zealous fighters, while ʿAbdallah b. al-Zubayr fought with a small force and a troop of Khawārij.<sup>83</sup> It was again Marwān who soundly assessed the fighting forces in his talk with Muslim b. ʿUqba. He explained that the common people in Medina had no fighting spirit and that only few of them would fight with resolution and conviction; they also lacked weapons and riding beasts, he remarked.<sup>84</sup>

The battle of the Ḥarra is thus seen to be the result of a conflict between the owners of estates and property in Medina and the unjust Umayyad rulers who robbed them of their property.

<sup>81</sup> See al-Ṭabarī, *op. cit.* iv, 373, lines 5–6; Ps. Ibn Qutayba, *op. cit.* i, 171.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>83</sup> See Ibn Saʿd, *op. cit.* v, 146, inf.; Ps. Ibn Qutayba, *op. cit.* i, 178, 181.

<sup>84</sup> Ps. Ibn Qutayba, *op. cit.* i, 172.